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This paper investigates forces that shaped the decisions voters made in the June 23, 2016 
referendum on the UK's continued membership in the European Union. Using data gathered 
in a national panel survey conducted before and after the referendum, multivariate models 
informed by previous research on voting in major 'polity-shaping' referendums are used to 
assess factors affecting the choices voters made. Analyses document that both economic- and 
immigration-focused benefit-cost calculations strongly influenced voters' decisions.  
Combined with risk assessments, emotional reactions to EU membership and leader image 
cues, these calculations were major proximate forces driving referendum voting.  National 
identities were at work too, operating further back in the set of forces affecting attitudes 
towards the EU.  Taken together, the findings indicate that the narrow Brexit decision voters 
made on June 23rd reflected a complex mixture of calculations, emotions and cues. 
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Why Britain Voted for Brexit: 
An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 Referendum Vote 
 On June 23 2016 the British electorate made a historic decision to leave the European 
Union.  This article employs data gathered in a national panel survey conducted just before 
and immediately after the June 23rd referendum to investigate the forces that shaped the 
choices voters made in the referendum.  Analyses of the survey data enable us to address 
several important questions. Was the vote to leave the EU motivated primarily by 
instrumental considerations regarding the perceived costs and benefits of EU membership 
and risks that would be encountered should the UK decide to leave?  Or were decisions 
driven more strongly by feelings of national identity and anxiety over perceived threats to the 
native in-group, from immigration and the free movement of EU nationals? How influential 
were cues from prominent politicians, such as David Cameron, Boris Johnson and Nigel 
Farage, in motivating people to vote, either for remain or leave?  After providing a brief 
overview of major issues in the referendum campaign, we answer these questions using 
existing research on public attitudes towards the European Union to guide the specification of 
a model of factors affecting voting in the EU referendum.  Next, we report the results of 
empirical analyses of this referendum voting model and associated models of key predictor 
variables.  In the conclusion, we summarize major findings and discuss their implications for 
understanding why a majority of voters opted for Brexit. 
Key Issues in the Referendum Campaign 
 When all the referendum votes were counted 51.9 percent of those voting had opted to 
leave providing a lead over the Remain vote that extended to almost 7 percentage points in 
England.1 The vote for Brexit followed a campaign by several Eurosceptic groups—notably 
Vote Leave, Leave EU, Leave.EU and Grassroots Out—that had focused heavily on 
                                                      
1 Results of the referendum are available at www.electoralcommission.org.uk. For an account 
of the referendum campaign, see Shipman (2016).  For an analysis of correlates of the 
aggregate (local authority)-level results, see Goodwin and Heath (2016). 
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mobilizing public anxiety over immigration, the free movement of EU nationals and the 
further enlargement of the EU to encompass Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and possibly 
Turkey.  The pro-Leave campaign also had focused heavily on the issues of sovereignty and 
the economic costs of EU membership, variously claiming that voters could ‘take back 
control’ from unaccountable 'Brussels bureaucrats' by voting to leave the EU and that the 
country would save £350 million each week that could be redirected into the National Health 
Service (NHS).  
 In contrast, the campaign to remain in the EU repeatedly emphasized that heavy 
financial costs and major economic risks would accompany a Brexit decision.  The official 
campaign for Remain, Britain Stronger In Europe, joined Prime Minister David Cameron, 
Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney, leaders of large trade unions and major 
business corporations, prominent media commentators and miscellaneous celebrities to warn 
voters that exiting the EU would have dire consequences—households would £4,300 worse 
off each year, workers would lose £38 a week in wages and house prices might fall by as 
much as 18 percent.  Only days before the vote pro-Remain Chancellor George Osborne 
claimed that Brexit would produce a £30 billion ‘black hole’ in the budget that would 
necessitate harsh public spending cuts and tax increases.  Christine Lagarde, Director of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), cautioned that a vote to leave the EU would entail 
‘severe global damage.’  Shortly before polling day the IMF predicted that the effects of a 
vote to leave would be ‘negative and substantial’ and that Britain’s gross domestic product 
could lose 5.6 percentage points by 2019.  In perhaps the most high-profile intervention, U.S. 
President Obama travelled to London to warn voters that after Brexit the UK would be at ‘the 
back of the queue’ in future trade talks with the United States.  Just over a week before the 
vote, Chancellor George Osborne weighed in by raising the specter of tax increases and 
benefit cuts should the electorate be so foolish as to opt for Brexit.  Given the Remain 
campaign's highly negative tone, Boris Johnson and other leading Leave advocates accused 
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Remainers of blatant scaremongering and relabeled the campaign to stay as 'Project Fear'2.  
The label was uncomfortably close to the mark.     
 Taken together, the issues stressed by the Leave and Remain campaigns point to the 
importance of cost-benefit calculations and attendant risk assessments, feelings of attachment 
to a wider community and cues from political elites in shaping the outcome of the 2016 
referendum—three types of explanation that have received significant attention in studies of 
the drivers of public attitudes to the EU.  In the next section, we briefly review major 
theoretical themes and empirical findings in this research.  
What Drives Public Attitudes toward the EU? 
 The 2016 referendum was the second such event to ask UK citizens about their 
preferred relationship with Europe.  The first, which asked voters whether they wanted to 
stay in the Common Market, as it was then called, was held in June 1975 and saw the country 
endorse continued membership by a strong two to one margin (Butler and Kitzinger 1976).  
The forty-one years between the two referendums witnessed the development of a sizable 
literature on factors that shape public attitudes toward the EU (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton, 
1993; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 
1997; Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2005, Maier and Rittberger, 2008; Armingeon and 
Ceka, 2014). These studies explore a range of factors, including the influence of parties and 
elites on public opinion (e.g. Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries, 2007; Ray, 2003), the 
effects of media coverage of the EU on support for integration (Vliegenthart et al. 2008), the 
influence of national identities in shaping public attitudes (Carey, 2002), and the role of the 
economy in influencing support for further integration (Gabel and Whitten, 1997).  
 Hooghe and Marks (2005) provide a succinct summary of findings on what drives 
public attitudes towards European integration in their paper: ‘Calculation, Community and 
                                                      
2 'The campaign to stay in the EU is "Project Fear" says Boris Johnson'. The Independent, 
February 29, 2016. 
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Cues’.  They conclude that attitudes are driven by three broad factors.  First are calculations 
about perceived costs and benefits of integration, which vary according to who are seen to be 
the ‘winners or losers’ in this process.  Second are community considerations that relate 
principally to social identities, with people who subscribe to a more exclusive national 
identity being significantly more Eurosceptic than those who acknowledge multiple 
identities, such as feeling ‘British’ and ‘European’.  Third are cues or heuristics that voters 
use when forming opinions about the EU.  These cues include images of party leaders and 
other prominent politicians as well as partisan attachments and ideological predispositions.  
Hooghe and Marks summarize their argument as follows:  
 ‘Citizens take the economic consequences of market integration into account, both for 
 themselves and their countries.  They evaluate European integration in terms of their 
 communal identities their views towards foreigners and foreign cultures. Further, their 
 attitudes are cued by their ideological placement and by elites and political parties’ 
 (2005: 436-37). 
Cost-benefit calculations about European integration take different forms.  Some of 
the earliest research stressed the importance of the objective social characteristics of 
individuals, such as their occupational status and educational backgrounds (Gabel and 
Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel 1998; Inglehart, 1970).  People with high 
status occupations who possess significant human capital tend to benefit from lower trade 
barriers and the increased geographical mobility of labour brought about by enhanced 
European integration.  In contrast, individuals with low status, poorly paid occupations and 
few educational qualifications find themselves in competition with similarly low-skilled 
labour from EU member states.  This limits job opportunities and drives down wages.  As a 
result, high status individuals are likely to support EU integration, whereas lower status 
people are likely to oppose it (Gabel and Palmer, 1995).  Recent research also suggests that 
high levels of education have become a more influential driver of support for the EU over 
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time, with the less well-educated becoming less supportive (Hakhverdian et al. 2013).  Other 
studies also have produced evidence which suggests that individual economic cost-benefit 
analyses have become increasingly important for explaining public reactions to the EU since 
the 2008 financial meltdown and ensuing Eurozone crisis (Hobolt and Wratil 2015; see also 
Hobolt and DeVries, 2016). 
In their multi-country time-series analysis of attitudes towards EU integration Gabel 
and Whitten (1997) found that national inflation rates negatively affected support for EU 
integration over a five-year period in the 1980s.  They also found that measures such as trade 
relationships between countries within the EU encouraged positive support for integration.  
However, their analysis indicated that subjective judgments about economic conditions were 
significantly more important than the objective performance of economies, a finding that 
echoes results from the economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Clarke et al., 2009). 
 Regarding feelings of community, a number of studies demonstrate how attitudes 
toward EU membership and integration are influenced by attachments to one’s culture and 
society, as well as by a ‘fear of others’ which plays a significant role in defining identities 
(Carey 2002; McLaren 2002).  For example, research on support for the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) has documented the impact of anxiety over the perceived negative effects of 
immigration (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015; Clarke et al., 2016).  Hooghe and Marks (2004) 
suggest that national identity is more important than economic calculations for shaping 
attitudes about EU integration, a finding supported in later studies (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 
2011).  However, evidence on the effects of identity is mixed, with positive relationships 
existing between Scottish and Welsh identities and support for European integration (Haesly, 
2001).  Similar findings have been obtained in studies of other European countries, 
particularly in Eastern Europe (Maier and Rittberger, 2008).  Equally, in a laboratory 
experiment Vossing (2015) found that individuals with exclusive national identities were 
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more likely to be influenced by elites in forming their attitudes to European integration than 
individuals with mixed identities, suggesting that opinions can be quite volatile. 
In Britain, one of the striking features of public attitudes towards membership of the 
EU is how volatile these attitudes can be (Whiteley et al. 2013; Clarke et al., 2016).  Figure 1 
illustrates this point by showing trends in attitudes about EU membership in monthly Essex 
Continuing Monitoring surveys conducted between April 2004 and December 2015.3  Since 
the 2010 general election, approval for EU membership varied by nearly 17 points, ranging 
from a low of 33.0 per cent in June 2011 to a high of 49.8 per cent in July 2015, before 
receding sharply to 39.2 per cent in November of that year.  Disapproval of EU membership 
also fluctuated sharply and irregularly, reaching a high of 54.2 per cent in April 2012 before 
falling to a low of 36.5% in May 2015.  In December 2015, shortly before the referendum 
campaign, 42.6% approved of EU membership while 39.2 per cent disapproved. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
This pattern of ongoing large-scale volatility clearly presents a problem in explaining 
attitudes to the EU with a highly inertial variable like national identity.  Identity is driven by 
deep-rooted cultural and historical forces and survey evidence indicates impressive levels of 
aggregate stability.4  Yet the ‘fear of the other’ component of identity can change quickly, 
particularly if it is linked to a sudden crisis, for example over refugees in Europe or increases 
in levels of net migration due to the free movement of EU nationals.  Equally, perceptions of 
the economic consequences of EU membership as well as cues provided by politicians whose 
popularity is volatile are also potential candidates for influencing attitudes towards EU 
                                                      
3 For information about question wording and variable construction see the Measurement 
Appendix. 
 
4 Data from the 1970-2002 Eurobarometer Trend File show that in 1993, 60 per cent claimed 
to have exclusive national identities and nearly ten years later in 2002, the figure was very 
similar, 62 per cent.  In contrast, in 1993 45 per cent believed that EU membership was a 
good thing but in 2002 only 32 per cent did so. 
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membership. This implies that the balance of EU attitudes, especially in a highly charged 
referendum context, likely will be more dependent on immediate political issues, policy 
concerns and elite cues than on deeply rooted historical identities.  
In this respect, the findings of earlier research are noteworthy.  In their analysis of 
referendums on European integration Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) showed that the 
votes held to ratify the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the Single Market were best interpreted as 
public reactions to short-term, national and domestic issues rather than longer-term 
considerations about the overall future of the EU.  Thus, the unpopularity of the governments 
in Denmark and France helped to ensure a rejection of the treaty in the former country and 
near rejection in the latter.  Franklin and his colleagues contrast this with Ireland which had a 
more popular government at the time and where the referendum passed easily.   
Subsequent studies have confirmed that attitudes towards the EU are closely tied to 
domestic political issues and policy-making (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Marsh 2015).  For 
example, Steenbergen, Edwards and De Vries (2007) argue that elite and mass opinions 
interact to influence public attitudes to integration. Similarly, Ray (2003) shows that parties 
influence voters in relation to EU integration, but the effect depends on levels of elite 
agreement over integration and the strength of attachment that individuals have to various 
parties.  This suggests that, in general, elite opinion will have a bigger influence on public 
attitudes when it is united than when it is divided.  
Theoretical Perspectives on Brexit Voting 
Based on the ‘Calculations, Communities and Cues’ framework outlined above we would 
expect that voting in the 2016 referendum on EU membership is influenced by each of these 
three factors, but with some amendments to the analysis.  Considering calculations first, this 
is commonly viewed as a ‘soft’ rational choice exercise in which voters evaluate the benefits 
of EU membership, often focusing on the economy and their own personal circumstances.  
They then weigh perceived benefits against perceived costs when making their voting 
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decision.  The present analysis takes this perspective into account using a battery of 
indicators designed to capture how benefit-cost calculations affected decision-making in the 
EU referendum.  
 As the referendum campaign and its aftermath revealed, public attitudes towards EU 
membership also have a strong emotional component.  Although some people have a strong 
affinity with the concept of being a member of a wider community, others strongly resist this 
idea.  Recent research on affective reasoning suggests that emotional aspects of decision-
making have substantial effects on the political choices that people make (Marcus, Neuman 
and MacKuen, 2000; Neuman et al.; Garry, 2013).  For this reason, our survey included a 
question designed to capture the emotions people experience when they think about the EU.  
The expectation is quite simple—positive emotional reactions will promote voting for 
Remain and negative emotions will prompt voting for Leave.  
 Another important consideration relates to how risk perceptions affect referendum 
voting.  In his review of research on referendums, LeDuc (2003) identified a 'status quo bias' 
in voters' decision making.  When faced with a complex and difficult issue of the type posed 
by major 'polity-shaping' events like the referendums on Scottish independence or EU 
membership, risk-averse voters typically opt for the 'the devil they know'.  Prior to the 
beginning of a referendum campaign sizable numbers of people tell pollsters that they 
support the change being proposed.  But, as the campaign progresses and decision day nears, 
some have misgivings, reconsider and, after a period of indecision, end up voting to keep 
things as they are.  This pattern ('LeDuc's law') is consistent with research in experimental 
economics and cognitive psychology that emphasizes the importance of risk orientations 
when individuals are making choices in contexts of high stakes and abundant uncertainty 
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).  Accordingly, we incorporate a measure of perceptions 
of the risks of leaving the EU in our analyses. 
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 We analyze community influences on attitudes towards the EU using data on 
perceptions of voters' identifications as British, English, Scottish, Welsh, European or 
something else.  As observed above, Hooghe and Marks make the case for the effects of such 
identities on attitudes towards the EU. However, our expectations about the impact of 
identities on voting in the 2016 referendum are tempered by recent research on voting in the 
2014 Scottish Independence referendum and voting for the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 
elections to the Holyrood Parliament which tends to discount the importance of identity 
(Johns, Mitchell and Carman, 2013).  Also, as noted above, evidence indicates that identities 
tend to be quite stable over extended time periods.  Accordingly, if identities are influential, 
their effects likely will be antecedents in the causal chain of forces affecting referendum 
voting, rather than having an immediate effect on the voting decision 
  Research on how cues affect public attitudes towards the EU emphasizes the roles of 
political parties and party leaders.5  In the case of the EU referendum the minor parties and 
their leaders such as UKIP and Nigel Farage, the SNP and Nicola Sturgeon and the Liberal 
Democrats and Tim Farron adopted clear and well publicised positions.  In contrast, both 
Labour and the Conservatives were divided on the referendum question—the latter much 
more so than the former.  Prime Minister David Cameron campaigned vigorously for Remain 
while former London mayor Boris Johnson—also a very prominent Conservative politician—
campaigned to leave alongside less well-known Eurosceptic cabinet ministers, such as 
Michael Gove, Chris Grayling and Priti Patel.  Johnson was widely seen as an unofficial 
leader of the Leave campaign. As extremely high profile figures on opposite sides of the 
referendum question, Cameron and Johnson were heavily covered by media throughout the 
                                                      
5 In addition to the referendum voting literature, there is abundant experimental evidence 
indicating the importance of cues (heuristics) for decision-making in various contexts.  See, 
e.g., Gigerenzer (2008); Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur (2011); Kahneman (2011). 
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campaign.6  This gave them ample opportunity to cue the public about how to vote on June 
23rd.  In contrast, since the Conservative Party as a whole was deeply divided and had been 
sending contradictory messages about 'Europe' to the electorate for many years before the 
campaign began, this very likely muted the impact of a more general Conservative partisan 
heuristic.        
 Labour was more united on the issue of UK membership with only a handful of MPs 
such as Gisela Stuart and Frank Field supporting Brexit.  However, Labour’s internal discord 
over the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, who was seen as providing a lukewarm endorsement 
of continued EU membership, meant that Labour was sending mixed messages to the voters. 
Corbyn's unwillingness to campaign enthusiastically for Remain was traced by many 
journalists to his well-documented Eurosceptic sentiments in earlier years.  Corbyn's 
desultory campaign efforts, together with the much publicised Conservative divisions over 
the EU, eroded the strength of cueing effects of the Labour Party and its leader. 
Data and Methods 
The data employed to study voting in the EU referendum were generated by a national panel 
survey7 conducted as part of the Essex Continuous Monitoring Survey.  The first wave of the 
survey was in the field from the 18th to 20th of June and the second wave was conducted 
shortly after the referendum on June 27th to June 29th.  The sample sizes for the pre- and post-
referendum waves were N = 2218 and N = 1993, respectively. The panel design is well-
suited for studying how various factors affected voting in the referendum.  Voting was 
measured in the post-referendum wave and, with the exception of campaign contacts, all  
predictor variables were measured in the pre-referendum wave.  Measuring predictor 
                                                      
6 Gabel and Scheve (2007) suggest that parties typically send out multiple cues rather than a 
single cue in referendum campaigns because they are not unitary actors and internal party 
dissent ensures that voters hear alternative messages.  In the 2016 EU referendum the 
Conservatives were very much a case in point. 
        
7   The survey was conducted via internet by YouGov, plc., with funding provided by the 
ESRC's 'The UK  in a Changing Europe' programme. 
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variables in the pre-referendum wave of the survey helps alleviate threats to inference which 
can bedevil analyses that rely on cross-sectional data (see, e.g., Whiteley et al. 2016). 
Results 
 In the pre-referendum wave of the Essex CMS referendum panel survey, 46.4 per cent 
of respondents intending to vote reported that they would vote Remain and 47.9 per cent 
indicated they would vote Leave, with the remaining 5.8 per cent saying they 'didn’t know'.  
If, as discussed earlier, many in the latter group ultimately would decide to stick with the 
status quo, these numbers suggest that Remain might have been able to secure a narrow 
victory by attracting most of those who had not made up their minds.  Of course, that did not 
happen—on June 23rd, 51.9% voted Leave and 48.1% voted Remain.  Vote totals in the post-
referendum wave of our survey closely mirrored the result, with 50.7 per cent stating they 
had voted Leave and 49.3 per cent saying that they had voted Remain.8   
 In the earlier discussion we argued that benefit-cost considerations were likely to be 
very important for explaining the vote.  Figures 2 and 3 display responses to survey questions 
about the perceived costs and benefits of leaving or remaining in the EU.  The questions 
address several topics, including the economy, personal finances, immigration, terrorism, 
foreign affairs, and sovereignty.  As Figure 2 illustrates, respondents were inclined to think 
that if Britain left the EU then it would be worse off regarding the economy (39 per cent v. 24 
per cent) and their own financial circumstances (30 per cent v. 12 per cent), but they felt very 
differently about immigration—fully 51 per cent thought that there would be less 
immigration if the UK left the EU and only 3 per cent thought that there would be more.  At 
the same time, Figure 3 shows that a plurality (41 per cent) agreed with the proposition that 
EU membership helped to provide workers for jobs that Britons are unwilling to do. 
(Figures 2 and 3 about here) 
                                                      
8 A 95% confidence interval (standard error = 1.2 per cent) for the vote shares reported in the 
survey easily covers the actual vote percentages for Remain and Leave. 
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 During the referendum campaign the Remain side championed the EU as a force for 
peace as well as prosperity. A plurality of our survey respondents agreed—37 per cent 
believed that EU membership helped to keep the peace in Europe while 29 per cent thought 
the opposite.  With regard to international affairs 21 per cent believed the UK would have 
less influence in world affairs if it left the EU while 15 per cent thought it would have more 
influence. However, a clear majority of 51 per cent indicated that they thought EU 
membership eroded British sovereignty.  Finally, there was a tendency to think that continued 
EU membership enhanced the risk of terrorism.  Specifically, 21 per cent stated that the risk 
would be greater if the UK stayed in the EU and 16 per cent said the risk would be smaller if 
it left.  When asked a second question on the topic, the difference was larger—47 per cent 
agreed that there would be more terrorism if the country remained in the EU and 28 per cent 
disagreed (see Figure 3).   
 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Acock, 2013) is used to summarize these several 
perceived benefits and costs of leaving the EU.  This analysis suggested that two factors 
could provide a useful representation of the data.  Items focusing on the economy and 
Britain’s influence in the world load heavily on factor one, whereas items focusing on 
immigration and security issues load heavily on factor two.  Factor scores derived from the 
CFA analysis are employed in the multivariate modelling presented below. 
 Figure 4 contains frequency distributions for variables measuring emotional reactions 
to EU membership.  These items are derived from a question asking respondents to describe 
their feelings about the country’s EU membership by selecting up to four words from a list of 
eight descriptors.  Four of the words described positive emotional reactions and four 
described negative reactions.  The figure illustrates that feelings of unease dominated with 44 
per cent selecting this word.  Although 26 per cent of the respondents described their feelings 
as ‘hopeful’ and this was the second most popular choice in the list no other positive word 
was selected by more than 14 per cent.  Overall, as the two bars on the far right of Figure 3 
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indicate, 32 per cent chose one or more positive words, while 50 per cent chose one or more 
negative words.  On the eve of the referendum negative emotions clearly outweighed positive 
ones when people thought about UK membership in the EU.  
(Figure 4 about here) 
 Figure 5 displays responses to a question which asked people to use an 11-point scale 
to indicate how risky leaving the European Union would be. On the scale, 0 indicates ‘no 
risk’ and 10 ‘very risky’. As the figure illustrates, risk perceptions were widely dispersed. 
Although the mean score (5.6) was very close to the scale's mid-point (5), opinion was tilted 
towards the 'risky' end, with a majority (54 per cent) assigning scores of six of greater.  In 
contrast, only one-third (33 per cent) gave scores below the mid-point, thereby indicating that 
they did not think the risks would be severe.  If risk assessments influenced referendum 
voting, the expectation is that the more risk people perceived the less likely they would be to 
prefer Brexit. 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 The community aspect of attitudes to membership was measured by a question which 
asked respondents if they felt ‘British’, ‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’, ‘European’, or some 
other nationality.  Forty-eight per cent described themselves as ‘British’ with 33 per cent 
describing themselves as ‘English’, 6 per cent as Scottish and 3 per cent as ‘Welsh’.  Only 
3.5 per cent described themselves as ‘European’ with a further 6 per cent choosing another 
national identity or saying they 'didn't know'.  The expectation is that national identities will 
influence the vote. Compared with those identifying themselves as British, we expect those 
thinking of themselves as English or Welsh will be less favourable towards EU membership 
whereas those identifying themselves as European of Scottish will be more favourable.  This 
is because the former identities (English, Welsh) are narrower than a more inclusive identity 
of being ‘British’ or , a fortiori, 'European'. However, in the case of Scotland, the recent 
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upsurge of nationalism suggests that many of those espousing a Scottish identity see EU 
membership as an attractive alternative to staying in the UK. 
 The impact of cues on referendum voting was investigated by asking respondents to 
rate several prominent politicians using 11-point (0-10) ‘likeability’ scales, where zero means 
‘strongly dislike’ and ten means ‘strongly like’.  These scales have proved very useful in 
summarizing important leader image traits, such as competence, honesty, responsiveness and 
trustworthiness (Clarke et al. 2009; Whiteley et al., 2013).  The hypothesis is that respondents 
will be more responsive to cues provided by leaders they like rather than those they dislike.  
Given the positions taken by key leaders in the referendum we would expect that positive 
feelings about David Cameron or Jeremy Corbyn would encourage individuals to vote to 
remain, whereas positive impressions of Boris Johnson or Nigel Farage would encourage 
them to vote to leave.   
 Other possible cues came from the political parties and also from the Remain and 
Leave campaigns.  The divisions in the Labour and Conservative parties suggest that cues 
from them might be largely ineffective in influencing the vote because they were sending 
mixed messages in the Conservative case and weak messages in the Labour case.  In contrast, 
cues from the SNP, Liberal Democrats and UKIP were quite clear and so attachments to 
these parties might well have influenced the vote. These possibilities are tested by including 
measures of voters' partisan attachments in the analyses.  In addition, three other predictor 
variables were specified. Two of these variables measure contact with the Leave and Remain 
campaigns. The expectation is that people exposed to a campaign would be more likely to 
vote for that option. A third predictor measures the perceived importance of 'Europe' as an 
issue. Over the years 'Europe' has become a codeword for Euroscepticism and, accordingly, 
designating Europe as an important issue can be taken as a useful proxy of the salience of 
Eurosceptic sentiments that could prompt Leave voting. 
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 Finally, we consider the possible effects of four socio-demographic variables.  During 
the campaign numerous polls showed large differences in support for/opposition to EU 
membership across age groups, with older people indicating that they were more likely to 
endorse Brexit than were younger people.  Similarly, echoing previous research on attitudes 
towards the EU (Ford and Goodwin, 2014), many polls revealed that less well-educated 
people and those in lower social classes were more likely to be Leave supporters.  In contrast, 
relatively little was said about gender differences in attitudes toward the EU.  The effects of 
these four variables (age, education, gender and social class) are assessed by including them 
in the multivariate analyses. 
 We begin by estimating the direct effects on referendum voting of the several 
predictor variables discussed above.  Since the dependent variable is a dichotomy (vote 
Leave = 1, vote Remain =0), model parameters are estimated using binomial logit procedures 
(Long and Freese, 2014).  In equation form, the model is: 
         logit(E[Vote]) = B0 + B1*Fecinf + B2*Fimter + B3*Emreac + B4*Euiss +  
   B5-B8*Leader+ B9-B14*Partyid + B15-B19*Natid +  
   B20-B21*Ccamp + B22-B25*Demos   (1) 
where: Vote  = referendum vote; Fecinf = economy-influence benefit-cost factor; Fimter = 
immigration-terrorism benefit-cost factor; Emreac = emotional reactions to EU; Euiss = 
importance of EU issue; Leader = leader images (Cameron, Corbyn, Farage, Johnson); Natid 
= national identities (British, English, European, Scottish, Welsh, Other); Ccamp = contact 
by Leave or Remain campaigns; Demos = socio-demographics (age, education, gender, social 
class).  Table 1 displays the results of this analysis.   
Overall, the model fits the data very well, with a McKelvey R2 of .90. Over 93 per 
cent of voters are correctly classified by the analysis—this represents an 86.2 per cent 
reduction in prediction error. These summary statistics testify that the model provides a 
strong statistical explanation of the referendum decisions our survey respondents made.     
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(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 Both the economic-influence and immigration-terrorism benefit-cost factors played  
very significant roles in explaining the vote to leave.  Table 1 shows that respondents who 
were optimistic about the economy and Britain’s role in the world if the country were to exit 
the EU were much more likely to vote Leave (p < .001).  Similarly, those who believed that 
that Britain would be better able to control immigration and counter terrorist threats if it were 
not part of the EU were more likely to vote Leave (p < .01).  As also expected, perceptions of 
risks associated with leaving the EU have a highly significant impact (p < .001) on 
referendum voting—respondents who thought that Brexit was risky were much less likely to 
opt to leave than those who minimized the risks.  Emotional reactions to the EU were 
significant (p < .001) as well; as expected, positive reactions to the EU stimulated a vote to 
remain, whereas negative emotions promoted a leave vote.  In addition, and again as 
expected, those who designated the EU as an important issue were more likely to vote to 
leave (p < .05). 
 The national identity measures are not statistically significant with the sole exception 
of Scottish identification; those who identified themselves as Scottish were less likely to vote 
to leave than were those who identified themselves as British (see Table 1).  Equally, socio-
demographic characteristics had no direct effects apart from a very modest tendency (p < .10) 
for individuals in higher socio-economic grades to vote for remain.  The cues variables 
indicated that party cues were largely irrelevant with the exception of a negative effect 
associated with Conservative partisanship, indicating that Conservative identifiers were more 
likely to vote to remain, other things being equal. Leader images were another story. 
Although feelings about the David Cameron and Jeremy Corbyn were not influential, feelings 
about Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage had highly significant effects (p < .001). Controlling 
for the influence of all other predictors, positive images of the leaders of the Leave campaign 
significantly enhanced the likelihood of voting to exit the EU. 
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 Next, we assess the explanatory power of various statistically significant (p < .05) 
predictors. Since the binomial logit model of referendum voting has a nonlinear functional 
form, interpretation of the strength of predictor variables is not straightforward (Long and 
Freese, 2014).  To provide intuition, we assess the impact of a continuous predictor variable 
by computing the probability of voting Leave for a respondent whose score on a given 
predictor places that person at the top 10 per cent of the distribution on that variable, while 
holding all other predictors constant at their mean values.  Next, we compute the probability 
for a voter whose score on the variable places that individual at the bottom 10 per cent.  We 
then take the difference.  For the two significant dichotomous predictors (Conservative party 
identification, Scottish identity), we compute the difference in the probability of voting Leave 
for respondents with scores of 0 and 1 on these variables.  Other categories of party 
identification and national identity are set at 0 for these computations and continuous 
predictors are again set at their mean values. 
 Figure 6 documents that the economics-international influence predictor had a very 
strong effect on referendum voting.  As scores on this variable moved from the bottom 10 per 
cent (high costs, low benefits of leaving) to the top 10 per cent (low costs, high benefits of 
leaving), the probability of voting to leave increased by fully .78 points (on a 0-1 scale). 
Cost-benefit calculations regarding the impact of Brexit on immigration and terrorism also 
were very powerful—as these calculations moved from the lowest 10 per cent (negative) to 
the highest 90 per cent (positive), the likelihood of casting a Leave ballot increased by .62 
points. 
(Figure 6 about here) 
 Predictably, risk perceptions had the opposite impact of benefit-cost calculations.  
These effects were sizable—as perceptions of the risks associated with leaving the EU moved 
from the lowest 10 per cent to the top 10 per cent the probability of voting for Brexit fell by 
fully .71 points (see Figure 6). This indicates that risk orientations had a strong impact on 
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referendum voting, although, contradicting 'LeDuc's law', their effects were not sufficient to 
yield a Remain victory.  Emotional reactions to membership also exerted substantial effects, 
with a shift from the 10 per cent (negative) to the 90 per cent (positive) rank on the EU 
emotions scale reducing the probability of a Brexit ballot by .48 points. 
 Leader image cues provided by Farage and Johnson were influential too.  In Farage's 
case, as 'feeling thermometer' scores about him moved from the bottom 10 per cent to the top 
10 per cent along the 0-10 'likeability' scale, the probability of voting Leave increased by .36 
points. The comparable probability change as feelings about Johnson became increasingly 
positive was somewhat larger, .42 points.  Other effects were less powerful; for a respondent 
with average scores on other predictor variables, Scottish identity reduced the likelihood of 
voting to leave by .32 points, and Conservative partisanship reduced it by .14 points. 
 Additional insight regarding the ability of various classes of predictor variables to 
account for voting in the referendum is provided by the statistics summarized in Figure 7.  
The figure displays McKelvey R2 and AIC values for several logit models of the vote that use 
different specifications of predictors.9 As shown, the benefit-costs model dominates its 
competitors, with the largest R2 (.85) and the smallest AIC (748.35).10  Other relatively 
powerful models include the risk assessment model (R2 = .73), the emotional reactions to the 
EU model (R2 = .71) and the leader cues model (R2 = .71). The remaining models have much 
smaller R2's and considerably larger AICs.  Thus, the R2 values for the partisan cues, national 
identities and socio-demographics models are only .26, .15 and .16, respectively.  Note also 
that the composite model that specifies all of the predictor variables (see Table 1 above) has 
better fit statistics (R2 = .90, AIC = 658.02) than any of its sub-models.  Taken together, these 
                                                      
9  When examining these numbers note that larger R2 and smaller AIC values indicate that a 
model has greater explanatory power compared to its rivals.  See, e.g., Burnham and 
Anderson (2011). 
 
10  Analyses of data gathered in a pre-referendum survey conducted in conjunction with the 
2015 British Election Study also documents the importance of cost-benefit assessments.  See 
Hobolt (2016). 
  20
statistics document important effects of benefit-cost perceptions, risk assessments and leader 
images on voting in the EU referendum. However, they also testify that the strongest 
explanation is provided by the composite model that incorporates all of the predictor 
variables.  
(Figure 7 about here) 
 Table 2 steps back from the vote and examine the effects of several predictor 
variables on the  benefit-cost scales, the two most important predictors in the vote model.  In 
addition to predictors from the vote model, we also include a variable measuring negative 
attitudes towards immigration and a variable tapping perceptions that Britain has lost control 
of its economy to the EU.  Since the dependent variables are continuous factor scores, model 
parameters are estimated using OLS regression. 
(Table 2 about here) 
  Both models in Table 2 have quite strong explanatory power, with R2 values of .69 
and .75, respectively.  Parameter estimates reveal that although voters' impressions of Jeremy 
Corbyn and David Cameron did not directly influence the vote, the images of these two 
leaders exerted indirect effects (p < .001) by working to shape voters' benefit-cost evaluations 
of a Brexit decision.  Positive evaluations of Cameron and Corbyn nudged respondents 
towards perceiving fewer benefits and more costs of leaving the EU, with the effects being 
significantly stronger for the prime minister than for the Labour leader in the case of 
economic-international influence calculations.  Predictably, positive images of Leave leaders, 
Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, had the opposite effects—working to move both types of 
benefit-costs evaluations in a pro-Brexit direction.    
 The partisanship measures show that Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
party identifications cued voters in expected ways, increasing perceptions of the benefits and 
reducing perceptions of the costs of remaining in the EU.  Interestingly, the Conservative 
partisanship effects were weak, unlike those of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This was 
  21
probably because the Tories were so divided on the issue, and this served to weaken the 
ability of Tory partisanship to cue voters about costs and benefits of EU membership.  
Finally, there is weak evidence that the Remain campaign had an impact on perceptions of 
benefits and costs, whereas the Leave campaign appeared to have none.      
 Although, with the exception of viewing oneself as Scottish, national identities did 
not have directly influence referendum voting, these identities did have a variety of modest 
but significant effects on benefit-cost evaluations.  English identifiers were significantly more 
likely than those who viewed themselves as 'British' to emphasize the benefits rather than the 
costs of exiting the EU.  The opposite was true for Scottish and European identifiers.  Welsh 
identifiers were an intermediate case; they were no different from British identifiers 
regarding economic-influence benefit-cost evaluations, but were significantly more likely to 
have immigration-terrorism evaluations that would help to prompt a Leave vote. 
 Negative attitudes towards immigration had highly significant effects (p < .001) on 
both types of benefit-cost assessments. As anticipated, voters with highly negative attitudes 
about immigration were more likely than other people to extol the benefits of Brexit and to 
minimize the costs of doing so.  This effect obtained not only for the immigration-terrorism 
benefit-cost factor but also for the economy-international influence factor. Perceptions that 
Britain's economic sovereignty had been lost to the EU mattered as well. Again, the effects 
are predictable; those who believed the EU had seized control of the British economy were 
more likely than other voters to see the benefits and minimize the costs of Brexit.    
 Finally, the performance of the socio-demographic characteristics is noteworthy.  As 
Table 3 documents, university educated people and those in higher social grades were 
significantly less likely to see the benefits of leaving in the EU than were other people. In 
contrast, older voters were more likely to judge that Brexit would have benefits by helping to 
control immigration and reducing the threat of terrorism. Gender differences in benefit-cost 
assessments were small and insignificant. 
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(Table 3 about here) 
 Next, we model the effects of various predictors on perceptions of risk, the third most 
important predictor of voting in the referendum. Using OLS regression for this purpose, we 
see that the model fits the data very well, with the R2 indicating that 69 per cent of the 
variance in risk assessments is explained (Table 3). Two highly significant predictors (p < 
.001) in this model are negative attitudes towards immigration and perceptions that Britain no 
longer controls its own economy. Parameter estimates show that negative attitudes towards 
immigration tended to dampen perceptions that leaving the EU would be risky. This was also 
true of perceptions that Britain has lost control of its economy to the EU.   
 Leader images were highly significant (p < .001) predictors of risk orientations as 
well. As one would anticipate, positive feelings about Cameron and Corbyn were associated 
with greater perceived risks of leaving the EU, whereas the positive feelings about Farage 
and Johnson were associated with lower perceived risks. Partisan identifications were 
significant too (p < .001) with Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat identifiers 
thinking that the risks of leaving the EU were higher than did other party identifiers or non-
identifiers. 
 Of the other predictors, the only significant national identity variable was 'European' 
(p < .05).  As expected, people viewing themselves as European rather than British were 
more likely to believe that exiting the EU would entail substantial risks. Among socio-
demographics, age has a highly significant (p < .001) impact, with younger people being 
more likely to emphasize risks attendant upon Brexit.  Education, gender and social class are 
not statistically significant, thereby indicating that these socio-demographic characteristics 
did not exert direct effects on the perceived risks of Brexit.         
Conclusion: Brexit Voting Reconsidered 
 This paper has investigated the factors that shaped the decisions voters made in the 
historic 2016 referendum on the UK's continued membership in the European Union.  
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Drawing on previous research on referendum voting and the studies of factors shaping public 
attitudes to the EU, we specified multivariate statistical models to assess the strength of 
various forces affecting the vote.  The models were analyzed using data gathered in a national 
panel survey of the British electorate conducted just before and shortly after the referendum.   
Results of these analyses emphasize the importance of benefit-cost calculations, risk 
assessments and emotional reactions to EU membership as proximate predictors of 
referendum voting.  Cues—what psychologists call heuristics—were important as well.  
Particularly noteworthy were the sizable direct and/or indirect effects associated with the 
images of various leaders of the Remain and Leave campaigns, including UKIP Leader Nigel 
Farage, former London mayor, Boris Johnson, Prime Minister David Cameron and Labour 
Leader Jeremy Corbyn.  Partisan cues were signficant too, but their effects were weaker and 
largely worked indirectly via shaping benefit-cost evaluations and risk assessments.  
Other forces also were working further back in the causal chain.  Models for cost-
benefit calculations and risk assessments documented the strong influence of negative 
attitudes towards immigration, as well as effects of the perceived loss of economic 
sovereignty and national identities.  Controlling for these several factors, age mattered as 
well, with younger people being significantly more likely to emphasize the risks of Brexit. 
  During the referendum campaign, the Remain side deployed a veritable 'Davos A List' 
of world leaders, senior civil servants, business moguls and celebrities to try and convince 
voters of the negative economic consequences that would ensue if the UK were to leave the 
EU. 'Project Fear', as it was called by Leave advocates and unsympathetic media 
commentators, portrayed Brexit as a very risky, economically self-destructive and ill-advised 
course of action.  The Leave forces countered with dire warnings about how EU membership 
fuelled uncontrolled immigration, increasing terrorist threats, the loss of sovereignty and an 
accompanying erosion of democratic accountability.  Although the dire scenarios depicted by 
Prime Minister Cameron and his allies were insufficient to secure a Remain majority, this 
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does not mean that their arguments were ineffective as forces affecting individual-level 
voting. Rather, and as the analyses presented above show, both economic- and immigration-
focused benefit-cost calculations had strong effects on the referendum choice.  Combining 
with risk assessments, emotional reactions to the EU and leader image cues, these 
calculations were key immediate forces driving voting in the EU referendum. The narrow 
Brexit decision voters made on June 23rd thus reflected a diverse mix of calculations, 
emotions and cues.  Given the strength of these forces demonstrated in the analyses presented 
above and the narrow division of the vote, it is plausible that a substantial change in any of 
them could have changed the referendum outcome.  That said, we leave conjectures about 
how the EU might have gone to the realm of 'common room counterfactuals'—at least for 
now.       
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 Table 1.  Binomial Logit Analysis of Factors Affecting  
Voting to Leave the European Union 
  
Predictor                                 B           s.e. 
 
Benefits-Costs of Leaving EU 
      Economy-Influence                 2.509***      .579 
      Immigration-Terrorism             1.013**       .370 
Risk Assessments of Leaving EU          -.373***      .062 
Emotional Reactions to EU               -.304***      .096 
Importance of Europe as Issue            .595*        .270 
Party Leader Images: 
      Cameron                           -.035         .056 
      Corbyn                            -.047         .053 
      Farage                             .191***      .055 
      Johnson                            .195***      .056 
Partisanship: 
      Conservative                      -.570*        .324 
      Labour                            -.137         .331 
      Liberal Democrat                  -.420         .449 
      UKIP                              -.392         .565 
      SNP                               1.365         .739 
National Identity: 
      English                            .184         .243 
      Scottish                         -1.614**       .550 
      Welsh                             -.289         .591 
      European                          -.860        1.307 
      Other                             -.289         .591 
Campaign Contact: 
 Remain Campaign                   -.081         .193 
      Leave Campaign                     .275         .278 
Socio-Demographics: 
      Age                               -.006         .007 
      University Education               .112         .238 
      Gender                             .029         .220 
      Social Class                      -.149†        .101 
Constant                                1.368*        .759 
 
 
McKelvey R2 = .90 
Percentage Voters correctly classified = 93.2 
Percentage reduction in classification error (Lambda) = 86.2%  
N = 1736 
                          
*** - p < .001; ** - p < .01; * - p < .05, † - p < .10, one-tailed test 
 

















Table 2.  OLS Regression Analyses of Predictors of Perceived Benefits  
and Costs of Leaving the European Union 
 
                                     Benefits-Costs of Leaving EU 
 
                               Economy & International    Immigration- 
                                      Influence            Terrorism 
 
Predictor                           B         s.e.        B       s.e. 
 
 
Negative Attitudes towards 
      Immigration                  .227***   .013       .474***   .020 
EU Control of UK Economy           .141***   .023       .204***   .036 
Party Leader Images: 
      Cameron                     -.046***   .004      -.063***   .006      
      Corbyn                      -.029***   .004      -.051***   .006 
      Farage                       .039***   .005       .062***   .007 
      Johnson                      .051***   .004       .082***   .007 
Partisanship: 
      Conservative                -.044*     .028      -.097*     .043 
      Labour                      -.090***   .028      -.140***   .043 
      Liberal Democrat            -.141***   .040      -.202***   .062 
      UKIP                        -.050†     .038      -.095      .059 
      SNP                          .018      .063      -.001      .097 
      Other Parties               -.575      .598      -.032      .073 
National Identity: 
      English                      .041*     .021       .091**    .032 
      Scottish                    -.098*     .047      -.084      .072 
      Welsh                        .062      .053       .146*     .081 
      European                    -.140*     .061      -.240**    .094 
      Other                       -.067†     .046       .048      .071 
Campaign Contact: 
 Remain Campaign             -.026*     .012      -.029†     .019 
      Leave Campaign              -.013      .018       .005      .027 
Socio-Demographics: 
      Age                          .001      .001       .002*     .001 
      University Education        -.041*     .020      -.038†     .030 
      Gender                      -.005      .018       .017      .028 
      Social Class                -.024**    .008      -.023*     .013 
Constant                          -.020      .052      -.133†     .080 
 
R2 =                                     .69                   .75 
N = 1736 
                          
*** - p < .001; ** - p < .01; * - p < .05, † - p < .10, one-tailed test 
      




Table 3.  OLS Regression Analysis of Predictors of Perceived Risks 
 of Leaving the European Union 
 
                                                                           
 
Predictor                                B         s.e.         
 
 
Negative Attitudes towards 
      Immigration                      -.733***   .077       
EU Control of UK Economy               -.740***   .139       
Party Leader Images: 
      Cameron                           .217***   .024            
      Corbyn                            .149***   .024     
      Farage                           -.202***   .027       
      Johnson                          -.220***   .026       
Partisanship: 
      Conservative                      .384*     .166     
      Labour                            .419**    .165     
      Liberal Democrat                  .401*     .240     
      UKIP                             -.159      .230     
      SNP                               .061      .378     
      Other Parties                    -.278      .284     
National Identity: 
      English                          -.105      .123     
      Scottish                          .348      .279      
      Welsh                            -.301      .314      
      European                          .771*     .364      
      Other                            -.131      .273      
Campaign Contact: 
 Remain Campaign                   .117†     .073      
      Leave Campaign                   -.031      .106      
Socio-Demographics: 
      Age                              -.024***   .003      
      University Education              .058      .117      
      Gender                           -.013      .108      
      Social Class                      .064      .051      
Constant                               6.827***   .311      
 
R2 =                                          .69           
N = 1736 
                          
*** - p < .001; ** - p < .01; * - p < .05, † - p < .10, one-tailed test 
      
Note: risk assessment scores vary from 0 to 10 with higher scores 













































































































































Figure 6.  Impact of Significant Predictors in Referendum Voting Model 
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